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Abstract
Armed groups frequently issue ad hoc commitments that contain a law of armed
conﬂict component. These commitments detail the obligation of the relevant armed
group to abide by international humanitarian law, the Geneva Conventions, or
particular rules set out in the commitment. They commit the group to abide by
international standards, sometimes exceed international standards, or in certain
respects violate international standards. Although these commitments are often
overlooked, they offer certain lessons for the law of armed conﬂict. This article
considers the commitments of armed groups with respect to two speciﬁc areas of the
law that are either of contested interpretation or seemingly inapplicable to non-
international armed conﬂicts, namely the identiﬁcation of legitimate targets and the
prisoners of war regime.
* I am grateful to the British Academy for a research grant that allowed me to obtain some of the
commitments of armed groups and other armed group practice that are mentioned in this article. Thanks
are also due to Olivier Bangerter who generously shared with me his own collection of armed group
commitments.
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The law of armed conﬂict forms part of public international law. Accordingly, the
materials that comprise the core of public international law – treaties, custom, and
judicial decisions – also comprise the core of the law of armed conﬂict. For these
reasons, when reference is made to the law of armed conﬂict, the materials
that instinctively spring to mind include the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
1977 Additional Protocols, the Customary International Humanitarian Law study
concluded under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC),1 and the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Likewise, in both public international law and the law of
armed conﬂict, the actors that are the most prominent in terms of the creation and
development of the law are states and state-empowered bodies such as international
courts and tribunals.2
Yet, in non-international armed conﬂicts in particular, a whole host
of other materials purport to regulate the conﬂict, some of which emanate from
armed groups. These materials frequently have a law of armed conﬂict component,
containing as they do explicit or implicit reference to concepts associated
with international humanitarian law (IHL) or international human rights law.
Alternatively, they may concern related issues, such as the environment or internally
displaced persons. These materials tend to be overlooked as they emanate from non-
state actors and do not comprise part of the fabric of international law. They may
also prove difﬁcult to locate. Nonetheless, their potential importance cannot
be overstated. They provide an indication as to the views of armed groups on
humanitarian norms and they comprise a useful entry point for engaging with
armed groups on humanitarian issues. The mere existence of these materials does
not, of course, mean that the groups that issue them will comply with the law.
Commitments and compliance are linked, but the former does not always lead to the
latter. Nonetheless, commitments of armed groups do constitute a further means by
which the law of armed conﬂict may be implemented and enforced.
This article analyses the substance of armed groups’ commitments from the
perspective of the law of armed conﬂict. It sets out a typology of commitments of
armed groups and considers instances in which the commitments are consistent
with the standards set by the law of armed conﬂict and instances in which
they depart from that law. Departure from existing standards includes instances in
which commitments fall short of required standards as well as instances in which
commitments go above and beyond required standards. The latter are particularly
instructive in light of a certain view that exists, namely that armed groups are (only)
violators of the law. The article then turns to two particular areas: identiﬁcation of
legitimate targets and prisoner of war status and treatment. The ﬁrst is controversial
in its interpretation, while the second does not apply to non-international armed
conﬂicts as a matter of law. Accordingly, both these subjects constitute a useful lens
1 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 2 vols,
ICRC/Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005.
2 See generally, Anthea Roberts and Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Law-making by non-state actors: engaging
armed groups in the creation of international humanitarian law’, in Yale Journal of International Law,
Vol. 37 (forthcoming).
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through which to explore the commitments of armed groups. In relation to the
former, the views of armed groups provide an additional perspective on the debate;
with regard to the latter, their views indicate that, in particular instances, the
commitment may be in advance of the law.
A typology of commitments
The commitments of armed groups can be loosely divided into four categories:
unilateral declarations, ad hoc agreements, codes of conduct and internal
regulations, and legislation. To these four categories, three others can be added,
namely responses to reports of fact-ﬁnding missions, press releases and ad hoc
statements, and expressions of motivations for taking up arms.3 Although the latter
three categories do not constitute commitments as such, they remain important for




Unilateral declarations usually take the form of commitments to abide by
international humanitarian law, the Geneva Conventions, or other speciﬁc rules.4
One set of unilateral commitments that take a more or less standard form are the
Deeds of Commitment on anti-personnel mines concluded under the auspices of
Geneva Call.5 Unilateral declarations are issued more frequently on an ad hoc basis.
For example, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) stated:
In its conﬂict with the Turkish state forces, the PKK undertakes to respect the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the First Protocol of 1977 regarding the
conduct of hostilities and the protection of the victims of war and to treat those
obligations as having the force of law within its own forces and the areas within
its control.6
Unilateral declarations may also be issued in relation to particular norms.
For example, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Sudan Liberation
Movement–Unity (SLM–Unity), both of Darfur, committed to speciﬁc norms of
international humanitarian law:
We will do our utmost to guarantee the protection of civilian populations in
accordance with the principles of human rights and international humanitarian
3 This part develops the discussion in Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Re-envisaging the international law of
internal armed conﬂict’, in European Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, 2011, pp. 261–262.
4 See below, ‘Equivalence with the law of armed conﬂict’.
5 On Geneva Call, see http://www.genevacall.org/ (last visited 27 September 2011).
6 ‘PKK Statement to the United Nations’, 24 January 1995.
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law. In collaboration with UNICEF, we will adopt measures ensuring protection
of children in Darfur. We also afﬁrm the principles of freedom of movement.
We reafﬁrm our commitment to refrain from targeting or forcibly displacing
civilian populations, destroying civilian infrastructure, recruiting children for
military operations, and to hold to account perpetrators of acts of rape and
other forms of gender based violence. We recognize that placing military assets
and personnel in close proximity to civilian areas increases the risk that civilians
will be caught up in hostilities or even targeted. We will therefore continue
our policy of maintaining a proper physical separation between our armed
forces and the civilian population. We also continue to commit to curtailing the
militarization of IDP/refugee camps.
We reafﬁrm our commitment to clearly instructing our personnel on the
ground regarding their obligations under human rights and international
humanitarian law.7
Unilateral declarations of adherence to Additional Protocol I purportedly pursuant
to Article 96(3) of that Protocol have also been issued.8
Ad hoc agreements
Bilateral agreements are not infrequently concluded between armed groups and
states with which those armed groups are in conﬂict. These agreements may relate to
the law of armed conﬂict or to speciﬁc issues of that law. Such ad hoc agreements
include special agreements envisaged by Common Article 3, which calls upon
parties to the conﬂict ‘to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part
of the other provisions of the [particular] Convention’, but are broader than such
agreements alone. They include agreements on human rights, such as the San José
Agreement between the Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Martí
para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN),9 as well as ceaseﬁre and peace agreements that
contain a law of armed conﬂict component. Ad hoc agreements are also concluded
between armed groups and UN entities or humanitarian agencies, usually on issues
relating to humanitarian assistance.10 Tripartite agreements are concluded on
occasion, between the state, the non-state armed group, and a UN entity.11
7 ‘Statement by the Opposition Movements [JEM and SLM–Unity]’, undated (published on 11 July 2008),
available at: http://www.hdcentre.org/projects/sudan (last visited 27 September 2011).
8 See e.g. National Democratic Front of the Philippines, ‘Declaration of Undertaking to Apply the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I of 1977’, addressed to the Swiss Federal Council, 5 July 1996; National
Democratic Front of the Philippines, ‘Declaration of Undertaking to Apply the Geneva Conventions of
1949 and Protocol I of 1977’, addressed to the ICRC, 5 July 1996.
9 ‘Agreement on Human Rights’, annexed to UN Doc. A/44/971-S/21541, 16 August 1990.
10 See e.g. Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-United/Operation Lifeline Sudan, ‘Agreement on ground
rules’, May 1996.
11 See e.g. ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Sudan, the Sudan Peoples
Liberation Movement and the United Nations regarding United Nations Mine Action Support to Sudan’,
19 September 2002.
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Codes of conduct and internal regulations
Just as states draw up military manuals, non-state armed groups draw up codes of
conduct.12 These codes of conduct, along with other internal regulations, regulate
the behaviour of members of the group in their relations both with other members
and with persons external to the group. Codes of conduct and internal regulations
do not relate solely to issues of the law of armed conﬂict. Indeed, some codes and
regulations do not relate to the law of armed conﬂict at all.13 Others do so implicitly,
containing rules that have an equivalent in the law.14 Perhaps the classic codes of
conduct and internal regulations are those of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army
(CPLA) issued by Mao Tse Tung originally in 1928. The CPLA’s Three Main Rules
of Discipline and Eight Points of Attention have been adopted by several unrelated
armed groups in the period since they were issued, including the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone, the National Democratic Front of the
Philippines (NDFP), and the National Resistance Army (NRA) of Uganda.15 The
Taliban of Afghanistan has also issued a code of conduct, most recently in 2010.16
Legislation
Again, just as states enact legislation, so too do armed groups. The state in which the
conﬂict is taking place will probably challenge the characterization of the materials
as ‘legislation’ and will contest its binding nature. Nonetheless, for the armed group
and for individuals living in territory under its control, this legislation will prove
important. Legislation is enacted particularly by armed groups that exercise control
over territory or which constitute de facto states. Such groups tend to have detailed
penal codes that apply to the territory under their control.17 Other groups enact
constitutions or issue other sorts of legislation.18 As with codes of conduct, much of
this material fails to refer to the law of armed conﬂict by name, but much concerns
concepts that are the subject of the law of armed conﬂict. Other legislation does refer
to matters of the law of armed conﬂict by name or concerns human rights issues or
the protection of displaced persons.19 Legislation differs from codes of conduct and
12 See e.g. in this issue, ‘Collection of codes of conduct for armed groups’.
13 See e.g. Kosovo Liberation Army, Interim Regulations on the Organization of Internal Affairs in the Army,
Prishtina, 1998.
14 See below, ‘Equivalence with the law of armed conﬂict’.
15 Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T,
Judgment (Trial Chamber), 2 March 2009, para. 705; ‘Basic rules of the New People’s Army’, Principle IV,
Point 3, reproduced in National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP), Declaration of Undertaking
to Apply the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I of 1977, NDFP Human Rights Monitoring
Committee Booklet No. 6, pp. 85–90; NRA Code of Conduct, reproduced in Ori Amaza, Museveni’s Long
March from Guerrilla to Statesman, Fountain Publishers, Kampala, 1998, Appendix 3.
16 Reproduced and translated as an annex to Muhammad Munir, ‘The Layha for the Mujahideen: an analysis
of the code of conduct for the Taliban ﬁghters under Islamic law’, in International Review of the Red Cross,
Vol. 93, No. 881, 2011, pp. 103–120.
17 See e.g. Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist, ‘Public Legal Code 2060 (2003/2004)’.
18 See e.g. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, ‘Tamil Eelam Child Protection Act’ (Act No. 3 of 2006).
19 See e.g. Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, ‘Revolutionary Women’s Law’.
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internal regulations in that it is enacted in order to regulate the conduct of persons
residing in the area in question, rather than governing the behaviour of members of
the armed group alone.
Each of these forms of commitment is considered rare, exceptional, and
unlikely to be issued. However, the practice reveals an altogether different picture.
One of the unfortunate points is that these commitments tend to be difﬁcult to ﬁnd,
not least because of the lack of a centralized repository for them.
Other important materials
Three further categories of material are important, even though they do not always
consist of commitments in the formal legal sense of the term. These materials give
an indication of the views of armed groups on the law and may set out the group’s
position on a particular point. Accordingly, they remain important.
Responses to reports of fact-ﬁnding missions
Armed groups sometimes respond to reports of UN Special Rapporteurs or reports
of human rights organizations, challenging particular facts or interpretations of
the law.20 They should be encouraged to enter into conversations with the relevant
body, particularly where the response does not take the form of an outright and
unreasoned denial. This creates points of entry within the group for discussion on
related norms and aids increased knowledge on their part.
Press releases and ad hoc statements
Many non-state armed groups maintain websites. These contain, inter alia, press
releases and other statements setting out the position of the groups on various issues
relating to the law of armed conﬂict. Unilateral declarations and commitments may
also be found on the groups’ websites. Ad hoc statements on the law may also be
issued through other organizations.21
Expressions of motivations for taking up arms
Armed groups may also set out the reason as to why they have taken up arms.
Not infrequently such reasons include human rights violations taking place in the
state in question and ongoing discrimination. Accordingly, following on from these
explanations, it is not at all unusual for armed groups to state that the future state
will respect human rights and international law. For example, during the 2011
20 See e.g. NDFP, Letter to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon on children in armed conﬂict, 24 November
2008; ‘KNU [Karen National Union] Press Statement on Report of UNSG’, 27 April 2009; ‘Report of the
Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan Issued 2 October
2009: A Response from JEM [Justice and Equality Movement]’, 16 November 2009.
21 See e.g. ‘Statement of the Opposition Movements [JEM and Sudan Liberation Movement–Unity
(SLM–Unity)]’, above note 7.
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violence in Libya, the National Transitional Council issued a statement in which it
provided that:
The interim national council will be guided by the following in our continuing
march to freedom, through espousing the principles of political democracy. We
recognise without reservation our obligation to:
. . .
8. Build a democratic Libya whose international and regional relationships
will be based upon:
a. The embodiment of democratic values and institutions which respects its
neighbours, builds partnerships and recognises the independence and
sovereignty of other nations. The state will also seek to enhance regional
integration and international co-operation through its participation with
members of the international community in achieving international peace
and security.
b. A state which will uphold the values of international justice, citizenship, the
respect of international humanitarian law and human rights declarations, as
well as condemning authoritarian and despotic regimes. The interests and
rights of foreign nationals and companies will be protected. Immigration,
residency and citizenship will be managed by government institutions,
respecting the principles and rights of political asylum and public liberties.
c. A state which will join the international community in rejecting and
denouncing racism, discrimination and terrorism while strongly supporting
peace, democracy and freedom.22
These expressions of motivations constitute important ‘hooks’ on which to engage
the armed group. For example, if an armed group commits violations of the law, it
could usefully be reminded of the reason why it is ﬁghting, namely to stand up
against violations in the ﬁrst place.
Commitments of armed groups
Having set out the various forms that commitments of armed groups take, the next
section considers how such commitments compare with the standards imposed by
the law of armed conﬂict.
Equivalence with the law of armed conﬂict
Many commitments of armed groups reference IHL, the law of armed conﬂict, the
Geneva Conventions, or speciﬁc rules, by name. These commitments, whether
unilateral declarations, bilateral agreements, or of a different form, are necessarily
equivalent to that which is required by the law, given that they act as a renvoi to the
22 See e.g. National Transitional Council, ‘A vision of a democratic Libya’, 29 March 2011.
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law. Commitments of this sort have been made by many an armed group. For
example, in 1988, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which fought
against the Government of Sri Lanka, indicated that it had ‘transmitted our notice of
acceptance of the Geneva Conventions I–IV of 1949 and the Protocols Additional I
and II to the Geneva Conventions to United Nations Headquarters and to the
International Committee of the Red Cross’.23 In 1991, the NDFP ‘declare[d] its
adherence to international humanitarian law, especially Article 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions as well as Protocol II additional to said conventions, in the
conduct of the armed conﬂict in the Philippines’.24 Most recently, during the 2011
armed conﬂict in Libya, the National Transitional Council declared that it ‘would
like to reiterate that its policies strictly adhere to the “Geneva Convention relative to
the treatment of Prisoners of War”’.25
Commitments to respect international law are also contained in bilateral
agreements concluded between warring parties. The Abidjan Peace Agreement
between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF) provides a useful example of this tendency. That agreement provided that
‘[t]he Parties undertake to respect the principles and rules of international
humanitarian law’.26 Such commitments may prove important should the peace
agreement fail, as was the case with the Abidjan peace agreement itself, or should
ﬁghting recommence following the conclusion of a ceaseﬁre agreement. The RUF
would later draw on this aspect of the Agreement, commenting that both the
Government and the RUF ‘had committed themselves to . . . full respect for human
rights and humanitarian laws’.27
Other declarations are less concrete, but still refer to the law of armed
conﬂict. For example, in 1980, the União Nacional para a Independência Total
de Angola (UNITA) declared that it ‘renews its commitment to the Geneva
Conventions and subscribes to the fundamental rules of international law applicable
in armed conﬂicts’.28 Quite which rules UNITA was committing to abide by is
unclear, given the lack of formal category of the ‘fundamental rules of international
law applicable in armed conﬂicts’. Nevertheless, the commitment acts as a renvoi to
international law.
These types of commitments are useful in light of their exact equivalence to
the law. The armed group commits to exactly what it is that the law requires through
a renvoi to the law. However, very real disadvantages are also inherent. When the
23 Letter from Vellupillai Prabhakaran, Leader, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, to Members and
Observers, United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Forty-fourth session, 24 February 1988. See
also Letter from VelummylumManoharan, Representative, LTTE International Secretariat, to Honourable
Judges of the US Court of Appeal District of Colombia Circuit (undated), reproduced in the Sunday Times
(Sri Lanka), 16 November 1997.
24 NDFP ‘Declaration of adherence to international humanitarian law’, 15 August 1991, reproduced in
NDFP, above note 15, Annex D, p. 98.
25 National Transitional Council, ‘The treatment of detainees and prisoners’, 25 March 2011.
26 Abidjan Peace Agreement, 30 November 1996, Article 21. See also the Preamble to the Agreement.
27 ‘Lasting peace in Sierra Leone: the Revolutionary United Front Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) perspective and
vision’, undated.
28 Declaration by UNITA, 25 July 1980, reproduced in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 20,
No. 219, 1980, p. 320.
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armed group commits to abiding by ‘international humanitarian law’, it may not be
familiar with the content of ‘international humanitarian law’. It may not be aware
that it includes the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, various weapons
treaties, rules relating to cultural property, and so forth. Furthermore, the armed
group may not have the capacity to abide by all the rules of IHL even if it were
willing to do so.29
Accordingly, there are advantages in armed groups committing to the
substance of particular rules rather than simply referring to the legal terminology
used to describe those rules. Commitments to the substance of particular rules may
prove more beneﬁcial given that all parties concerned have a clear understanding as
to the nature and content of a particular commitment. These commitments may
be equivalent to that contained in the law of armed conﬂict, albeit expressed in
a different manner. For example, the 2010 Layha for the Mujahideen provides that
‘[t]he persons responsible in the provinces and districts, squad leaders and all other
Mujahids should take maximum measures to avoid deaths and injuries among
common people, as well as the loss of their vehicles and other properties’.30 This is
akin to the IHL obligation to take all feasible precautions.31 The CPLA’s Three Main
Rules of Discipline provided: ‘[d]on’t take a single needle or piece of thread from
the masses’, while its Eight Points of Attention contained the following injunctions:
‘[d]on’t hit or swear at people’, ‘[d]on’t damage crops’, ‘[d]on’t take liberties with
women’, and ‘[d]on’t ill-treat captives’.32 The parallels between these injunctions
and obligations laid down by international humanitarian law – the principle of
humane treatment, and the prohibitions on inhuman treatment, outrages upon
personal dignity, pillage, and sexual violence – are evident.
Beyond the law of armed conﬂict
The ‘substance approach’ also suffers from certain disadvantages. When commit-
ments of armed groups do not refer to particular categories of rules, along the lines
set out above, but describe the conduct that is prohibited, there is a danger that the
commitment may depart from existing standards. This is not inherently a bad thing,
for in such instances, the commitment of the armed group may go above and
beyond existing standards, offering greater protection to civilians and other persons
and entities caught up in the conﬂict than does the law of armed conﬂict.
For example, a 2009 agreement between the Government of the Philippines
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) commits the parties to ‘avoid[ing]
acts that would cause collateral damage to civilians’.33 This goes beyond the
29 See Marco Sassòli, ‘Taking armed groups seriously: ways to improve their compliance with international
humanitarian law’, in Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, Vol. 1, 2010, p. 32.
30 Layha for the Mujahideen, 2010, above note 16, Rule 65.
31 Additional Protocol I, Art. 57; J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 1, Vol. I, Rule 15.
32 See, for analysis, He Xiaodong, ‘The Chinese humanitarian heritage and the dissemination and of and
education in international humanitarian law in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’, in International
Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 83, No. 841, 2001, pp. 141–153.
33 ‘Agreement on the Civilian Protection Component of the International Monitoring Team’, 27 October
2009, Art. 1(a).
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requirement of international humanitarian law, which, in its rule on dispropor-
tionate attacks, balances the expected injury to civilians and damage to civilian
objects with the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, and prohibits
only such attacks in which the former would be ‘excessive’.34 Another area in which
the Government of the Philippines and the MILF have committed to standards
beyond that required by the existing law is the commitment of the parties to ‘safely
return evacuees to their place of origin, provide all the necessary ﬁnancial/material
and technical assistance to start a new life, as well as allow them to be awarded
reparations for their properties lost or destroyed by reason of the conﬂict’.35 This
provision should be compared with the relevant rules of customary international
law, which relate more narrowly to the right to return and to the respect for the
property of displaced persons.36
Armed groups may also prove ‘ahead of the curve’, committing to act or not
to act in a particular manner, such actions being required by international law only
at a later point in time. For example, the NDFP has indicated that it prohibited the
recruitment of children under the age of 18 years into its armed forces ‘since 1988,
ahead of the Convention on the Rights of the Child’. It has also noted that its
position in this regard ‘is far more advanced than the standard set by the Geneva
Conventions’.37 It will be recalled that common Article 3 is silent on the question of
the recruitment of children into armed forces or armed groups, while Additional
Protocol II adopts the standard of 15 years of age.38 In respect of a different area
of the law, in 1995, the RUF ‘appeal[ed] to the United Nations Security Council
to seize itself of the grave matter of the spread of small arms and the planting of
anti-personnel mines’. It noted that ‘[t]he constant use of heavy artillery and cluster
bombs ha[s] devastated the countryside’.39 It would take until 2008 for a
Convention on Cluster Munitions to be adopted, while, at the time of writing,
the conventional regulation of small arms remains under consideration. Also in
the realm of weapons, in 1988, the FMLN indicated it was abiding by the Mines
Protocol to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, setting out the
situations in which it was using mines and the associated precautions it was
taking.40 Yet, at the time in question, the Protocol was limited to international
armed conﬂicts alone, its scope of application being extended to non-international
armed conﬂicts only in 1996.
It may be said that commitments of armed groups are political in nature,
used as a tactic in the conﬂict, or made to enhance their reputation, all without any
intention of complying with them. With respect to certain commitments made by
certain groups, this may well be true. For example, the call on the part of the RUF to
34 Additional Protocol I, Art. 51(5)(b); J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 1, Vol. I, Rule 14.
35 ‘Agreement on Peace between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front’, 22 June 2001, Art. B3.
36 Cf. J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 1, Vol. I, Rules 132 and 133.
37 NDFP, NDFP’s Defense of the Rights of the Filipino Child, Publication of the NDFP Human Rights
Monitoring Committee, 2005, p. 9.
38 Additional Protocol II, Art. 4(3)(c).
39 ‘Footpaths to democracy: toward a new Sierra Leone’, 1995.
40 FMLN, The Legitimacy of Our Methods of Struggle, Inkworks Press, Berkeley, 1988, pp. 10–14.
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regulate small arms and cluster munitions was probably made just as much for
tactical reasons as it was for concern over the environment. Furthermore, despite
the commitments to respect IHL on the part of the RUF and the LTTE, violations of
that law were commonplace.41 However, the fact that parties to conﬂicts make
commitments for a variety of reasons is as true for states as it is for armed groups.42
Furthermore, the fact that certain commitments may be made for disingenuous
reasons cannot be used to tarnish all commitments. Accordingly, commitments of
armed groups remain important.
Below the law of armed conﬂict
This is not to suggest that commitments of armed groups invariably meet, or exceed,
international standards. In respect of certain norms, commitments fall below
existing standards and this is a very real danger with the ‘substance approach’. The
following examples usefully illustrate the point.
The 2010 Layha for the Mujahideen provides:
11. In case of the capture of contractors who transport and supply fuel,
equipment or other materials for the inﬁdels and their slave adminis-
tration, as well as those who build military centres for them and those
high- and low-ranking employees of security companies, interpreters of
the inﬁdels and drivers involved in enemy supply [business], if a judge
proves the fact that the aforementioned persons are indeed involved in
such activities, they should be punished by death. If the judge has not been
appointed yet in a province it is up to the person responsible in the
province to decide the fate [of a person] with regard to the issues of proof
and execution.
12. If a military inﬁdel has been captured, his execution, release through
prisoner exchange, intentional release or release upon payment in case the
Muslims need money, is at the discretion of the Imam and Najib Imam.
No one else has the authority to make this decision. If the captive becomes
Muslim, the Imam or Najib Imam has the authority to release him in a
prisoner exchange, provided that there will be no danger of his becoming
an inﬁdel again.43
These provisions clearly depart from international humanitarian law, in particular
the principle of humane treatment, and the rules relating to the treatment of
detainees.44
41 See e.g. SCSL, Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, above note 15; Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel
of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, 31 March 2011.
42 See Olivier Bangerter, ‘Disseminating and implementing international humanitarian law within organized
armed groups: measures armed groups can take to improve respect for international humanitarian law’, in
International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Non-state Actors and International Humanitarian Law:
Organized Armed Groups: A Challenge for the Twenty-ﬁrst Century, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2010, pp. 187,
192, and 196.
43 Layha for the Mujahideen, above note 16, Rules 11 and 12.
44 Common Article 3; Additional Protocol II, Arts 4 and 5; Additional Protocol I, Art. 75.
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An associated issue is that of the taking of hostages. It is well known that
IHL prohibits the taking of hostages.45 For its part, the Ejército de Liberación
Nacional (ELN) of Colombia has committed to IHL.46 However, it has deﬁned the
taking of hostages in such a manner as to allow certain actions that the law of armed
conﬂict would consider to constitute the taking of hostages. Thus, the ELN has
stated that it is ‘permissible to recover war taxes, and to detain persons who refuse to
pay them as a form of pressure in order to obtain payment. These detentions cannot
be considered “hostage-taking”, because we never use these persons as shields
during hostilities’.47
Practice in relation to particular norms
In the two sections that follow, the commitments and practice of armed groups
are considered in relation to two areas of the law that are controversial in their
interpretation or seemingly inapplicable in their application to non-international
armed conﬂicts, namely the identiﬁcation of legitimate targets and the prisoners of
war regime.
Identiﬁcation of legitimate targets
One area in which a considerable divergence of opinion exists is that of the
identiﬁcation of legitimate targets. One of the most fundamental rules of the law of
armed conﬂict is that civilians may not be made the object of attack.48 It is accepted
that the prohibition on the targeting of civilians does not extend to civilians for such
time as they take a direct part in hostilities.49 However, there is considerable
disagreement as to what this phrase actually means.50 Members of the state armed
forces are not protected from attack. Greater debate surrounds the question of when
members of the armed group may be attacked.51 However, even the most restrictive
view holds that members of the armed group may be attacked for such time as they
take a direct part in hostilities. Several armed groups have expressed their own views
on this point, usually taking a position that falls below that of any of the mainstream
views of the law of armed conﬂict. Nonetheless, these views need to be considered.
45 Common Article 3; Additional Protocol II, Art. 4; Additional Protocol I, Art. 75; J.-M. Henckaerts and
L. Doswald-Beck, above note 1, Vol. I, Rule 96.
46 See Ejército de Liberación, Declaración sobre el Derecho Internacional Humanitario, 15 July 1995.
47 Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista, Qué es humanizar el conﬂict colombiano?, 1 May 1996, quoted in Pierre
Gassmann, ‘Colombia: persuading belligerents to comply with international norms’, in Simon
Chesterman (ed.), Civilians in War, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 2001, p. 73.
48 Additional Protocol I, Art. 51(2); Additional Protocol II, Art. 13; J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck,
Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules, above note 1, Rule 1.
49 Additional Protocol I, Art. 51(3); Additional Protocol II, Art. 13(3).
50 See, in particular, ICRC, ‘Interpretive guidance on the notion of direct participation in hostilities under
international humanitarian law’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 90, No. 872, 2008, pp. 991–
1042. But see, for critical views of the ICRC interpretive guidance, the contributions to the symposium in
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 42, 2010, pp. 637–769.
51 ICRC, above note 50; New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, above note 50.
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The PKK has indicated that it:
regards the following groups as part of the Turkish security forces and,
therefore, as legitimate targets of attack:
- members of the Turkish armed forces;
- members of the Turkish contra-guerrilla forces;
- members of the Turkish Intelligence Service (MIT);
- members of the Turkish gendarmerie;
- village guards.
The PKK does not regard civil servants as members of the security forces, unless
they come within one of the above categories.52
Along largely similar lines, the NDFP has indicated that it:
regards as legitimate targets of military attack the units, personnel and facilities
belonging to the following:
1 The Armed Forces of the Philippines;
2 The Philippine National Police;
3 The paramilitary forces; and
4 The intelligence personnel of the foregoing.53
The NDFP has also indicated that ‘[c]ivil servants of the GRP [Government of the
Republic of the Philippines] are not subject to military attack, unless in speciﬁc cases
they belong to any of the four abovestated categories’.54
These statements reﬂect the position of the law of armed conﬂict in certain
respects, considering as they do members of the armed forces and the paramilitary
forces to be ‘legitimate targets of military attack’. The clariﬁcations surrounding
civil servants are useful in light of the fact that, in some conﬂicts, any representative
of the state is considered to be a legitimate target. More difﬁculty surrounds
the gendarmerie or national police. In general terms, members of the police force are
considered civilians.55 However, in some states, the police may be associated with
the armed forces, or may be attached to the armed forces in times of armed
conﬂict.56 Accordingly, much will turn on the speciﬁcities of the state in question
and on the facts. The NDFP’s limitation of intelligence personnel to the intelligence
personnel of the listed categories is to be welcomed as not considering all
intelligence personnel to be legitimate objects of attack. For example, intelligence
personnel who are tasked with activities entirely unrelated to the conﬂict could not
be considered legitimate targets of attack, although, in practice, differentiation along
these lines may prove difﬁcult. However, the NDFP’s limitation is eroded almost
52 ‘PKK Statement to the United Nations’, above note 6.
53 NDFP, ‘Declaration of Undertaking’, above note 8.
54 Ibid.
55 ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General’,
25 January 2005, para. 422.
56 See J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 1, Vol. I, p. 17.
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entirely with its interpretation of ‘intelligence personnel’ as including ‘casual
Government informers, such as peasants who answer when asked by [government]
soldiers to identify local CPP [Communist Party of the Philippines] members or
someone who calls the police when faced with NPA [New People’s Army]
extortion’.57 This is extremely broad and certainly inconsistent with international
standards.
For its part, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) took the view that ‘all
Serbian forces, whether the police, the military, or armed civilians, are our enemy’.58
On the one hand, reference to armed civilians could be taken to mean civilians
taking a direct part in hostilities. On the other hand, it could be overly inclusive.
Civilians who bear arms to defend themselves, or to prevent looting and the like,
would not be considered to be taking a direct part in hostilities.59 The ambiguity
surrounding certain terms and certain commitments is thus also potentially
problematic.
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) indicated in
1984 that the following individuals and entities are ‘declared enemies of the people
and therefore target of the SPLA/SPLM’:
a) The incumbent administration of Jaafer Mohammed Nimeiri, its
appendages and supporting institutions.
b) Any subsequent reactionary administration that may emerge while the
revolutionary war is still being waged.
c) Any individual or group of individuals directly or indirectly cooperating
with the autocratic regime in Khartoum in order to sustain or consolidate
its rule and to undermine the objectives and efforts of the People’s
Revolution.
d) Any individual or group of individuals who wage counter-revolutionary
war against the SPLA/SPLM or who circulate any subversive literature,
verbally or in written form against the SPLA/SPLM with the intent to
discredit it or turn public opinion against it.
e) Persons acting as agents or spies for the Sudan Government.
f) Armed bandits that operate to rob ordinary citizens, rape their women or
commit any other crime against them, their movable or immovable
properties or any other property of the People’s revolution.
g) Individuals or groups of people who propagate or advocate ideas,
ideologies or philosophies or organize societies and organizations inside
the country or abroad, that tend to uphold or perpetuate the oppression of
57 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston’,
UN Doc. A/HRC/8/3/Add.2, 16 April 2008, para. 31.
58 Interview with Jakup Krasniqi, spokesman of the Kosovo Liberation Army, published in Koha Ditore,
12 July 1998 (translated from Albanian), Exhibit P00328 in International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al., Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, 3 April 2008.
59 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-
T, Judgment and Sentence, 18 December 2008, paras. 2238–9; ‘Report of the International Commission of
Inquiry on Darfur’, above note 55, para. 292.
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the people or their exploitation by the Khartoum regime or by any other
system of similar nature.60
Just as with the other mentioned armed groups, the SPLM/A considered a much
broader section of society to be legitimate targets of attack. In particular, objects
of potential attack include ‘individuals directly or indirectly cooperating with’ the
government and persons who advocate ideas that perpetuate the oppression. This
widens matters considerably and, again, falls short of international standards.
Despite their considerable variance with the law of armed conﬂict, these
statements remain important because they set out, in concrete terms, the position
of groups on the identiﬁcation of (in their view) legitimate targets. It is revealing
that the positions adopted by a number of groups are largely similar, all of which
extend the objects that they see as potentially constituting a legitimate target. The
statements demonstrate that there is a considerable disparity between what some
armed groups consider legitimate targets and who or what the law does not consider
the subject of protection. They also indicate that there remains much work to be
done in this area of the law.
The prisoners of war regime
Combatant immunity, by which individuals are not prosecuted ‘merely’ for taking
part in hostilities, and the prisoners of war regime are limited to the law of
international armed conﬂict. No treaty provision applicable to non-international
armed conﬂict mentions either concept. At the Diplomatic Conference of 1949,
an attempt to introduce a rule prohibiting prosecution for taking part in a non-
international armed conﬂict did not succeed.61 At the Diplomatic Conference of
1974–1977, a proposal to introduce prisoner of war status into the law of
non-international armed conﬂict similarly failed.62 At the level of customary
international law, this is one of the few areas of real difference between international
and non-international armed conﬂicts,63 and among commentators there is near-
unanimity that this is the exclusive domain of the law of international armed
conﬂict.64
60 SPLM/A, Penal and Disciplinary Laws, 4 July 1984, Section 29(1)(c), quoted in J.-M. Henckaerts and
L. Doswald-Beck, above note 1, Vol. II, pp. 126–127.
61 Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949: Volume II Section B, Federal Political
Department, Berne, 1963, p. 44 (Norway), p. 49 (UK), and p. 322 (Norway). For criticism, see Volume II
Section B, p. 50 (Burma) and p. 99 (Denmark).
62 Ofﬁcial Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reafﬁrmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conﬂicts, Geneva (1974–1977), Volume 5, Federal Political
Department, Berne, 1978, p. 91, para. 6 (Norway); Volume 8, p. 359, para. 15 (Sweden); Volume 5, p. 187,
paras. 20–21 (Bangladesh). For criticism, see Volume 8, p. 293, para. 41 (Burundi).
63 See J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 1, Vol. I, Rules 106–108.
64 See e.g. Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, and Bruno Zimmerman (eds), Commentary on the Additional
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, International Committee of the Red
Cross, Geneva, 1987, p. 1332; Waldermar Solf, ‘The status of combatants in non-international armed
conﬂicts under domestic law and transnational practice’, in American University Law Review, Vol. 33,
No. 53, 1983, pp. 57–59; Leslie C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conﬂict, Manchester
University Press, Manchester, 2000, p. 318; Dieter Fleck, ‘The law of non-international armed conﬂicts’, in
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Armed group commitments and practice
Commitments of armed groups present a more nuanced picture. During the US civil
war, a bilateral agreement was concluded between General Dix of the Union
forces and General Hill of the Confederate forces, conﬁrming the applicability of
the prisoners of war regime to the US civil war, with its detailed provisions
on the exchange and release of prisoners of war.65 Too much cannot be read into
this practice given that it concerned a situation of belligerency. However, during
the Spanish civil war, the rebels declared themselves ‘ready to observe and
respect the Geneva Convention concerning the war wounded, the sick and the
prisoners’.66 Indeed, they went as far as declaring that they ‘respect[ed] and caus
[ed] to be respected, with the utmost scrupulousness, the laws and customs of
warfare’.67
Some years later, during the Algerian war of independence, the Front
de Libération Nationale (FLN) indicated its willingness to apply the provisions
of the Geneva Conventions from an early stage of the conﬂict. In a letter to the
ICRC, dated 23 February 1956, the FLN indicated its willingness to apply the
Conventions to all ‘prisonniers de guerre français’ taken by the FLN ‘sous réserve
de réciprocité de la part du Gouvernement de la République Française’.68
Throughout the conﬂict, the FLN insisted ‘that it had conferred upon captured
French soldiers the status of prisoners of war’,69 and internal FLN regulations
contained detailed rules on the law of war in general and the treatment of prisoners
of war in particular.70
During the attempted secession of Biafra from Nigeria, the Biafran
authorities ‘acknowledged, as a minimum, the applicability of the customary law
relating to prisoners of war’,71 and ‘assured the ICRC that they were prepared to
observe the provisions of the [Geneva] Conventions’.72 A Declaration of the Biafran
authorities ‘pledg[ed] to respect civilian populations, give the ICRC facilities for the
delivery of humanitarian assistance and organize the exchange of prisoners of
Dieter Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
2008, p. 627.
65 The ‘Dix-Hill Cartel’ for the General Exchange of Prisoners of War entered into between the Union and
Confederate Armies, 22 July 1862, reproduced in H.S. Levie (ed.), Documents on Prisoners of War,
International Law Studies, Vol. 60, 1979, p. 34.
66 Frédéric Siordet, ‘The Geneva Conventions and civil war’, in Revue internationale de la Croix-Rouge,
Supplement, Vol. 3, 1950, p. 140.
67 As cited in Norman J. Padelford, International Law and Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil Strife, Macmillan,
New York, 1939, p. 597.
68 ‘Lettre de la délégation algérienne au Caire à David de Traz’, 23 février 1956, quoted in Françoise Perret,
‘L’action du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge pendant la guerre d’Algérie (1954–1962)’, in
International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 86, 2004, p. 926.
69 Arnold Fraleigh, ‘The Algerian revolution as a case study in international law’, in Richard Falk (ed.), The
International Law of Civil War, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1971, p. 196.
70 See Mohammed Bedjaoui, Law and the Algerian Revolution, International Association of Democratic
Lawyers, Brussels, 1961, p. 215, n. 17; A. Fraleigh, above note 69, pp. 179 and 196.
71 Allan Rosas, The Legal Status of Prisoners of War, Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, Helsinki, 1976, p. 196.
72 ‘External activities’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 7, 1967, p. 536.
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war’.73 However, little information is available on the actual treatment of captured
soldiers by Biafran entities.
These four situations are by no means exhaustive. Eritrean rebel groups ran
‘formally organized prisoner of war camps’ during the secession from Ethiopia.74
In El Salvador, the FMLN declared that it had ‘taken concrete measures to . . .
guarantee respect for the government troops . . . that are under its control as
prisoners of war’. It also argued that it ‘treat[ed] prisoners of war well even though
the Government forces do not do the same’.75 In Turkey, the PKK indicated that it
‘will treat captured members of the Turkish security forces as prisoners of war’.76
Most recently, in Libya in 2011, as indicated above, the National Transitional
Council declared that it ‘would like to reiterate that its policies strictly adhere to the
“Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War”’.77
Thus, despite the absence of provisions on this point in the law of non-
international armed conﬂict, certain conﬂicts have seen armed groups declaring that
they will treat captured members of the state armed forces as prisoners of war,
although the precise extent to which there was compliance with the relevant rules is
open to question. This is not infrequently done through a commitment on the part
of the armed group to apply the Third Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War.
State commitments and practice
It may be said that members of armed groups would be the primary beneﬁciaries
were the prisoners of war regime to apply to non-international armed conﬂicts.
Accordingly, armed groups will afford treatment as prisoners of war to captured
soldiers in the hope that they themselves will be treated as prisoners of war if they
are captured. It is thus important to consider the ad hoc commitments of states and
state practice on prisoners of war in non-international armed conﬂicts. Here, too,
the position is interesting.
During the US civil war, an order of General Grant provided that ‘[p]ersons
acting as guerrillas without organization and without uniform to distinguish them
from private citizens are not entitled to the treatment of prisoners of war when
caught, and will not receive such treatment’.78 The order, dated 3 July 1862 and
predating the Dix–Hill agreement by a few weeks, suggested that those persons
acting as part of an army – organized and wearing uniforms –were entitled to
treatment as prisoners of war. The Lieber Code of 24 April 1863 conﬁrmed the
point, with its numerous detailed rules on prisoners of war.79
73 Cited in Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, ‘Respect for international humanitarian law by armed non-state
actors in Africa’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 88, No. 864, 2006, p. 907.
74 See Hilaire McCoubrey, International Humanitarian Law, Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1990, p. 175.
75 FMLN, above note 40, pp. 6–7.
76 ‘PKK Statement to the United Nations’, above note 6.
77 National Transitional Council, ‘The treatment of detainees and prisoners’, 25 March 2011.
78 Ofﬁcial Records of the War of the Rebellion, Series 1, Volume 17, Part 2, p. 69.
79 ‘Instructions for the government of armies of the United States in the ﬁeld’, 24 April 1863, Section III.
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During the Spanish civil war, the central government committed in a
declaration to the ICRC inter alia to co-operate in the setting up of a prisoner of
war information agency.80 This commitment was made two weeks prior to the
commitment of the rebels. The central government later announced that 4,000
prisoners would be ‘treated in accordance with the military code providing for the
handling of prisoners of war’.81
During the Algerian war of independence, France initially tried and
executed captured FLN ﬁghters. However, ‘on 19 March 1958 General Salan,
Commander-in-Chief of the French forces in Algeria, ordered that special camps be
set up for NLA [National Liberation Army, the armed wing of the FLN] combatants
captured while bearing weapons openly’.82 France made clear that these individuals
were not being considered prisoners of war but their treatment was to be akin to that
of prisoners of war.83 The relevant order provided that ‘the prisoners were to be
treated “in as liberal a manner as possible, and that this should be made known”’.
It continued: ‘[p]roposals for bringing captives before the courts should be
systematically avoided, except in the case of those who have committed atrocities or
who demonstrate a degree of fanaticism likely to prejudice a favourable evolution in
the general state of mind’.84 Captured ﬁghters were transferred from the ordinary
prisons in which they were housed to these special camps. For some time at least,
captured FLN ﬁghters were not prosecuted solely for taking part in the conﬂict.85
A letter from the French military command in Algeria to the French Ministry of
Justice dated November 1959 provided that:
les rebelles pris les armes à la main, qui ne sont coupables d’aucun crime
terroriste avant leur incorporation dans un groupe rebelle, ne sont pas
poursuivis, mais internés dans des camps militaires. Ils sont ainsi assimilés aux
membres d’une armée ennemie.86
In the view of the ICRC, prisoners detained in these special camps received
treatment ‘closely related to that of the prisoner-of-war camps’.87
80 For the text of the declaration, see F. Siordet, above note 66, pp. 139–140.
81 Norman J. Padelford, ‘International law and the Spanish civil war’, in American Journal of International
Law, Vol. 31, 1937, p. 226, citing a report in the New York Times of 10 August 1936. See also Ann Van
Wynen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, ‘International legal aspects of the civil war in Spain, 1936–39’, in
R. Falk, above note 69, p. 122.
82 François Bugnion, ‘Jus ad bellum, jus in bello and non-international armed conﬂicts’, in Yearbook of
International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 6, pp. 167–198.
83 A. Rosas, above note 71, p. 149.
84 F. Bugnion, above note 82.
85 A. Fraleigh, above note 69, p. 196; A. Rosas, above note 71, p. 149.
86 Letter of November 1959, quoted in Michel Veuthey, ‘La guérilla: le problème du traitement des
prisonniers’, in Annales d’Études Internationales, Vol. 3, 1972, p. 130. The English text that appears in
M. Bedjaoui, above note 70, p. 149, reads in the relevant part: ‘rebels captured with guns in their hands,
guiltless of any crimes of terrorism before joining a rebel group, are not prosecuted but are interned in
military camps. They are treated as members of an enemy army’.
87 ICRC, The ICRC and the Algerian Conﬂict, ICRC, Geneva, 1962, cited in A. Rosas, above note 71, p. 149.
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During the attempted secession of Biafra, the Federal Government of
Nigeria issued an Operational Code of Conduct for the Nigerian Army. This Code
included a number of instructions on the conduct of the conﬂict, including the
provision that ‘[s]oldiers who surrender will not be killed. They are to be disarmed
and treated as prisoners of war. They are entitled in all circumstances to humane
treatment and respect for their person and their honour’.88 Despite the conﬂict
ending with a clear ‘winner’, the government did not prosecute members of the
Biafran forces, instead releasing all captured prisoners.89
A more recent example in which the prisoners of war regime was
applied took place during the conﬂicts in the former Yugoslavia. The 22 May 1992
Agreement between representatives of the President of the Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the President of the Serbian Democratic Party, the President of the
Party of Democratic Action, and the President of the Croatian Democratic
Community committed the parties to respect and ensure respect for Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and brought into force other provisions of IHL.
The provision relating to captured combatants provided that ‘[c]aptured
combatants shall enjoy the treatment provided for by the Third Geneva Con-
vention’ relative to the treatment of prisoners of war.90
While the practice is certainly not such as to argue that there is a rule of
customary international law that requires captured ﬁghters to be granted prisoner of
war status, or even to be treated as prisoners of war, the position is more nuanced
than the law of non-international armed conﬂict suggests. States may not be willing
to declare in advance, through the law, that they will act in this manner. However, in
practice, in certain large-scale non-international armed conﬂicts, captured ﬁghters
have indeed been treated as prisoners of wars or have beneﬁtted from some form of
combatant immunity. Much of the practice pre-dates the ‘war on terror’ and it may
be that state classiﬁcation of the armed groups against which they ﬁght as ‘terrorists’
will affect the treatment of captured ﬁghters in this regard. In many respects, it is too
early to reach a deﬁnitive conclusion. However, it is interesting to note that the
United Kingdom Manual of the Law of Armed Conﬂict recommends that, ‘while
detained in military custody, persons who have taken a direct part in hostilities
should be given the same treatment as if they were prisoners of war’ and that
‘[w]herever possible, treatment equivalent to that accorded to prisoners of war
should be given’.91
88 ‘Operational Code of Conduct for the Nigerian Army’, July 1967, para. 4(e), reproduced in A. H. M. Kirk-
Greene, Crisis and Conﬂict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook 1966–1969: Volume I, Oxford
University Press, London, 1971, pp. 455–456.
89 ‘Note from the Nigerian Minister of Defence to the ICRC delegation in Lagos, 14 May 1970, ICRC
Archives, ﬁle 219 (186); ICRC Annual Report 1970, 10’, cited in F. Bugnion, above note 82.
90 Agreement No. 1 of 22 May 1992, para. 2.4, reproduced in Marco Sassòli and Antoine A. Bouvier (eds.),
How Does Law Protect in War?, ICRC, Geneva, 2006, p. 1765.
91 UK Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conﬂict, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
2004, pp. 398 and 390.
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Conclusion
Commitments of armed groups are important. Particularly in light of the fact that
armed groups cannot sign and ratify the grand multilateral treaties of the law of
armed conﬂict, commitments provide armed groups with an opportunity to commit
to the law. They allow engagement with the armed group on humanitarian norms in
general and the norms to which they have committed in particular. Although, in
some instances, armed groups may commit to norms that go below existing legal
standards, the fact that the position has been set out in advance and in writing
means that the international community can engage with them on the required
standards. Nonetheless, it may prove difﬁcult to get the group to move away from an
existing commitment, even if it falls below international standards. In other
instances, armed groups commit to standards that go above and beyond those
required by the law of armed conﬂict, and this is to be welcomed. Commitments of
armed groups, and indeed states, can also add nuance to the law. Even in areas in
which the law is clear, the practice may suggest that the picture is altogether more
complex. The law and practice relating to prisoners of war is one such instance. In
sum, ad hoc commitments form a useful addition to the traditional materials of
treaties, customary international law, and judicial decisions, and are deserving of
greater consideration that is currently afforded to them.
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